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Shermain D. Hardesty
Few agricultural marketing cooperatives have nationally prominent brand names. Instead, they tend to concentrate in 
commodity-oriented markets, which can be attributed to the cooperative principles—user-beneﬁ  t, user-ﬁ  nanced and 
user-control. However, these structural disadvantages can be overcome. Due to the user-beneﬁ  t principle, coopera-
tives often have seasonal product availability and/or limited product lines; they also suffer from the horizon problem, 
lacking the structure to provide long-term returns to members who invest in brand building. The user-beneﬁ  t principle 
can be converted into an advantage by using the cooperative identity as a marketing strategy, and the horizon problem 
can be remedied by implementing a delivery-rights system. Cooperatives’ limited access to capital is attributable to 
the user-ﬁ  nanced principle. Joint ventures, legislative reforms to expand cooperatives’ sources of equity capital and 
preferred stock offerings can be used to overcome this constraint. The homogeneous nature of cooperative boards is 
attributable to the user-control principle; it gives rise to the principal-agent problem. Forming subsidiaries or joint 
ventures to market branded products can remedy this situation, with the boards composed of individuals with expertise 
in branded products.
In 2002, revenues of the forty largest agricultural 
cooperatives totaled $57.4 billion (National Coop-
erative Bank 2003). However, only a limited num-
ber of these cooperatives have nationally prominent 
brands—Borden, Land O’Lakes, Ocean Spray, 
Sunkist, Welch’s, and Blue Diamond.
Why do so few large agricultural marketing co-
operatives have nationally prominent food brands? 
Several have branded food products with strong 
regional recognition; however, the basic structural 
characteristics of cooperatives appear to inherently 
impede brand building. These characteristics relate 
to the cooperative principles—user-beneﬁ  t, user-
ﬁ  nanced, and user-control.
The Importance of Branding
Many agricultural marketing cooperatives have 
opted to engage in vertical integration and process 
their members’ commodities into value-added food 
products. There are two basic strategies for com-
peting in the processed food industry: cost leader-
ship with branded or private label products, and 
differentiation in either the mass market or niche 
market(s) (Porter 1985). Although differentiation 
can be achieved by providing superior service or 
having unique distribution channels, it often re-
quires a brand that is well-recognized by the target 
market.
Competition for space on grocery shelves and the 
consumer’s dollar is ﬁ  erce. Gallo (1999) noted that 
advertising and promotion are critical to marketing 
food products in the U.S.; he attributed the high 
levels of marketing expenditures to three forces: 
the food market captures a large share of consum-
ers’ income relative to other categories, consumers 
continuously make food purchasing decisions, and 
food is one of the most highly branded categories 
in the U.S.
Marketing activities can be very costly. Kraft 
Foods introduced Philly Snack Bars regionally in 
1999 with a $4.7 million campaign using televi-
sion, print, public relations and sampling; it then 
expanded distribution nationwide, spending $11.6 
million from just January through June, 2000 (Reyes 
2001). Furthermore, branding requires a long-term 
investment; signiﬁ  cant consumer awareness cannot 
be achieved with an intermittent, short campaign.
Some cooperatives have accepted the challenge 
to develop national brands. Diamond of California, 
whose membership consists of walnut producers, 
recently launched its Emerald brand. The Emerald 
product line consists of fourteen snack-nut prod-
ucts, including single nut varieties and sweet and 
savory glazed-nut combinations. The cooperative’s 
marketing campaign includes television and print 
advertising and sponsorships of athletic events.
Alternatively, some cooperatives acquire com-
panies and/or rights to brand names. Dairy Farm-
ers of America (DFA), the nation’s largest dairy 
cooperative, purchased the Borden and Elsie brand 
licenses for cheese in 1998 to build its market share 
in branded retail cheeses. The New York-based 
cooperative, Pro-Fac, marketed its members’ pro-
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cessed fruits and vegetables through a long-term 
supplier relationship with Curtice Burns, whose 
brands included Comstock and Nalley’s. In 1994, 
Pro-Fac purchased Curtice Burns and renamed it 
Agrilink Foods. In 1998, it purchased Dean Foods 
Vegetable Company, including its Birds Eye brand. 
Unfortunately, Pro-Fac’s highly leveraged position 
forced the cooperative to sell a majority interest 
in Agrilink (renamed Birds Eye Foods) to Vestar 
Capital Partners (Pro-Fac 2004).
Many agricultural marketing cooperatives have 
chosen a cost-leadership strategy. For example, Cal-
ifornia-based Paciﬁ  c Coast Producers manufactures 
canned fruit and tomato products, and juices, fruit 
cups and gels as a private-label supplier. It invests 
in production facilities to continuously improve its 
efﬁ  ciency and product quality.
Previous Studies of Cooperatives’ Marketing 
Efforts
It is a common belief that agricultural marketing 
cooperatives advertise less extensively than their 
IOF counterparts. Gruber, Rogers, and Sexton 
(2000) investigated the validity of this belief us-
ing advertising-expenditure data from 1987. The 
data set involved 49 food product markets that 
each contained at least one agricultural marketing 
cooperative. Their model was based on the Dorf-
man-Steiner condition: the advertising-to-sales 
ratio, at the optimum, is equal to the price-cost 
margin times the advertising elasticity of demand. 
Ceteris paribus, ﬁ  rms with low price-cost margins 
will have lower advertising-to-sales ratios.
Among the ﬁ  rms that advertised, Gruber, Rog-
ers, and Sexton calculated mean advertising-to-sales 
ratios of 1.87% for cooperatives and 2.97% for the 
IOFs. The cooperatives averaged a 31.5% price-cost 
margin, while the IOFs’ average was almost twice as 
much (62.2%), and the comparable averages for the 
cooperatives and IOFs that did not advertise were 
21.4% and 37.5%, respectively. Whether or not they 
advertised, IOFs had higher price-cost margins than 
did cooperatives.
Gruber, Rogers, and Sexton’s empirical analysis 
was consistent with the Dorfman-Steiner condition; 
it conﬁ  rmed the importance of the price-cost margin 
as a determinant of advertising intensity. Their ﬁ  nd-
ings also suggested that being a cooperative actu-
ally had a positive estimated effect on advertising 
intensity; however, this result was only weakly 
signiﬁ  cant. They concluded that cooperatives tend 
to concentrate in commodity-oriented markets.
This conclusion was also consistent with previ-
ous research conducted by Rogers (1993) using data 
from 1982 for the 100 largest agricultural market-
ing cooperatives and the 20 largest food IOFs. He 
determined that agricultural cooperatives held their 
highest advertising shares in food products that had 
low value-added ratios, low product differentiation, 
were commodity-based, and had a high proportion 
of unbranded sales. Previous studies by Boynton us-
ing 1979 data (1982) and Combs and Marion using 
1977 data (1984) found that cooperatives are low 
users of advertising.
Structural Elements of Cooperatives That 
Impede Brand Building
Cooperatives’ tendency to concentrate in com-
modity-oriented markets and, hence, have limited 
branded market presence, can be attributed to their 
structural characteristics. The basic cooperative 
principles—user-beneﬁ  t, user-ﬁ  nanced, and user-
control—create challenges for cooperatives seek-
ing to build their brands. Cooperatives marketing 
branded products have to be especially resourceful 
in building their brand identities.
The User-Beneﬁ  t Principle
Cooperatives operate for the beneﬁ  t of their user-
members. In many cases, producers belong to a 
cooperative to have a “home for their product.” 
The resulting focus on processing and market-
ing member deliveries can cause a cooperative 
to have seasonal product availability and/or a 
limited product line. Year-round presence and a 
broad product line on grocery store shelves are 
necessary to maintain brand awareness among 
consumers. However, members of cooperatives 
have expressed disapproval when their coopera-
tive sources nonmember product. Sunkist’s Board 
approved a new marketing strategy which involved 
purchasing lemons and grapefruit from South Africa 
and Chile to leverage its well-known brand into 
Asian markets only after lengthy discussion and 
much resistance; members were concerned about 
competition from the imported fruit. To maintain its 
position as the citrus market leader, Sunkist needed 
to be a competitively priced, year-round supplier of 
a full line of citrus products (Smith 2004).Hardesty Cooperatives as Marketers of Branded Products   239
Cooperatives’ net margins are distributed to 
their user-members primarily in proportion to 
their patronage rather than as a return to members’ 
investment. This structural feature gives rise to the 
“horizon problem.” Cooperatives engaged in brand 
building must make signiﬁ  cant investments in prod-
uct development and marketing, with corresponding 
reductions in member proceeds over several years. 
However, the patronage-based earnings structure 
enables new members to join the cooperative and 
reap the beneﬁ  ts of the investment without having 
contributed. Furthermore, members often compare 
their cooperative’s returns with commercial prices 
for their commodity. Signiﬁ  cant brand-building 
expenses can cause a cooperative’s returns to be 
uncompetitive in the short term, causing losses in 
membership.
The User-Financed Principle
For many agricultural marketing cooperatives, 
member retains are the primary source of equity. 
Although investment in marketing is necessary 
to gain distribution on grocery store shelves and 
consumer awareness, their members are often re-
luctant to provide signiﬁ  cant equity capital or build 
reserves for investing in their cooperative’s market-
ing program. Part of their reluctance is attributable 
to the horizon problem discussed above. However, 
members also often face cash ﬂ  ow constraints that 
lead them to urge their board members to maximize 
cash patronage payments by minimizing member 
retains, which results in underinvestment in in-
tangibles such as advertising and development of 
multiple distribution channels.
Ocean Spray was the leading cooperative ad-
vertiser in Gruber, Rogers, and Sexton’s data set, 
although it ranked number 44 among all of the food 
companies in 1987. More recently, the cooperative 
suffered low returns for several years despite having 
a 54% market share as the number one brand in the 
unrefrigerated juice aisle (Aoki 2004). Soft drink 
giants Pepsi and Coca Cola have aggressively devel-
oped their strengths in the uncarbonated drink mar-
ket with their acquisitions of the Tropicana, Minute 
Maid, and Gatorade brands, and now own nearly 
75% of that market. In 2000, Ocean Spray lost its 
exclusive distribution agreement with Pepsi for its 
lucrative single-serve juices since 1992 when Pepsi 
purchased Tropicana and violated the no-compete 
clause. Ocean Spray no longer has a network to dis-
tribute its products in convenience stores, vending 
machines, and cafeterias—markets where growth 
opportunities are the greatest. Industry consultants 
have also pointed out that Ocean Spray does not 
have the ﬁ  nancial resources to out-advertise its 
rivals (Aoki 2004).
The User-Control Principle
The third major principle that cooperatives oper-
ate under is user-control. The boards of agricultural 
marketing cooperatives are made up almost exclu-
sively of producer-members; only 4% of the agri-
cultural cooperatives responding to a 2003 USDA 
survey had outside directors (Reynolds 2004). The 
homogeneity of the boards of most agricultural co-
operatives creates the “principal-agent problem,” in 
which the principals (producer members) lack the 
business expertise to provide adequate control of 
their agent (management). 
In a recent study regarding the failure of the Rice 
Growers Association of California, its board was 
found to be ill equipped to scrutinize the business 
decisions it was charged with overseeing (Keel-
ing, 2004). In particular, producer board members 
usually lack the marketing expertise needed to 
provide effective oversight of their cooperatives’ 
brand building strategy.
Overcoming Structural Disadvantages
Recent experiences of several cooperatives provide 
examples of how the structural disadvantages creat-
ed by the cooperative principles can be overcome.
The User-Beneﬁ  t Principle
The success of CROPP/Organic Valley illustrates 
how the user-beneﬁ  t principle can be converted into 
a branding asset. The marketing cooperative was 
formed in 1988 with seven members in Wisconsin 
to market organic produce, but quickly shifted into 
dairy products. Its membership has grown to 665 
producers in twenty states. It markets dairy, juice, 
eggs, and meat products under the Organic Valley 
brand; sales increased from $15 million in 1998 to 
$122 million in 2003 (Organic Valley 2004).
CROPP/Organic Valley differentiates itself by 
promoting its cooperative structure, identifying 
itself as “a cooperative of small organic family 
farms.” Instead of relying on traditional mass-Journal of Food Distribution Research 36(1) 240   March 2005
marketing approaches, it uses “guerrilla market-
ing” to maximize its limited marketing funds. 
Its milk cartons proﬁ  le local members and large 
storyboards featuring its members are displayed in 
grocery stores (Organic Valley 2004).
CROPP’s strategy connects its member-pro-
ducers with consumers who have moved from a 
price/product orientation to a value/experience 
orientation. In a national survey of 2,031 consum-
ers conducted in 2003, 69% reported that they 
were more likely to purchase food produced by 
farmer-owned cooperatives than food produced by 
other types of companies. Additionally, 64% agreed 
that food produced by a farmer-owned cooperative 
was of better quality than food produced by other 
types of companies (National Cooperative Busi-
ness Association 2003). The cooperative identity 
can provide an ideal positioning for cooperatives 
marketing certain foods, such as organic foods and 
grass-fed beef, to consumers concerned about food 
safety and environmental stewardship. 
The difﬁ  culties in brand-building created by the 
user-beneﬁ  t principle can be addressed by requiring 
members to own delivery rights. Delivery rights are 
a two-way contract obligating a member to deliver a 
speciﬁ  ed amount of farm product to the cooperative 
as well as requiring the cooperative to accept the 
speciﬁ  ed amount from the member. Delivery rights 
are marketable; their price ﬂ  uctuates according to the 
cooperative’s performance and earnings potential. 
When the cooperative Dakota Growers Pasta 
Company was formed in 1993, its delivery rights 
were marketed at $3.85 each to raise capital. Dur-
ing its second year of operation (1995), it produced 
about 100 million pounds of pasta under its Pasta 
Growers brand and generated a proﬁ  t of $ .46 per 
share. In 1999, its delivery rights were selling for 
$10 each (Kotov 2000). The delivery rights appre-
ciated in value to reward founding members for 
their risk tasking, even though the cooperative sold 
additional delivery rights to double its processing 
capacity.
Marketable delivery rights can remedy the hori-
zon problem created by the user-beneﬁ  t principle. 
They raise capital for investing in brand building 
and they restrict the beneﬁ  ts of the brand building 
to the users of the cooperative who hold them. De-
livery rights can generate a current return to mem-
bers through the cooperative’s higher earnings for 
its branded products, as well as a long-term return 
from the appreciation in their value.
The User-Financed Principle
Cooperatives can overcome the capital constraints 
associated with the user-ﬁ  nanced principle. Joint 
ventures are often effective in extending limited 
ﬁ  nancial resources. Naturipe, the oldest and larg-
est strawberry marketing cooperative in the U.S., 
expanded its market access by joining forces with 
Global Berry Farms, LLC (GBF). GBF’s other 
partners are MBG/Michigan Blueberry Growers 
Association (another cooperative), and Hortifrut 
(a privately held company based in Chile). GBF is 
reshaping the berry category by marketing straw-
berries, blueberries, raspberries, and blackberries 
year-round under the Naturipe brand. By marketing 
100% of their production through GBF, Naturipe’s 
members have a more secure and broader customer 
base. 
Although DFA acquired the Borden brand, its 
primary strategy with value-added products is 
to participate in joint ventures. Given the highly 
competitive nature of the U.S. dairy industry, DFA 
strategically selected 13 joint-venture partners 
who can proﬁ  tably manage plants across the na-
tion while DFA supplies the milk. For example, 
it manufactures and packages Frappuccino for the 
North American Coffee Partnership and a full range 
of cheese and salsa dips for Frito-Lay. While such 
joint ventures do not provide DFA with the returns 
possible from developing brands on its own, they 
do ensure long-term, reliable access to markets for 
members’ raw productswith considerably less 
investment in brand development.
A joint venture was the motivation for the Wyo-
ming Processing Cooperative Statute, which was 
passed in 2001 to facilitate equity-capital formation 
in cooperatives. Mountain States Lamb and Wool 
Cooperative spearheaded the reform because its 
producers lacked sufﬁ  cient capital to purchase a 
50% interest in B. Rosen & Sons, a lamb-products 
processor and marketer. The new statute enabled 
Mountain States to be considered a cooperative 
while being organized similar to a Limited Liabil-
ity Company with favorable passthrough taxation 
(Hanson 2002). Mountain States has two classes 
of members: patron members, who have rights and 
obligations of delivery of lamb to the cooperative; 
and nonpatron members, who are strictly investment 
members. The lamb is marketed under the brand 
developed by Rosen, Cedar Springs.
Preferred stock is also a potential ﬁ  nancing Hardesty Cooperatives as Marketers of Branded Products   241
source for large cooperatives. CHS, Inc., the largest 
agricultural cooperative in the U.S. and a Fortune 
500 company, completed an $86-million offering in 
January, 2003 of Perpetual Preferred Stock, which 
is now traded on the NASDAQ. CHS is striving to 
increase the earnings share from its processed-food 
business from 25% to 50%, although its members 
have stated that redemption of their retains are too 
slow. In January, 2004, CHS distributed an addi-
tional $13 million of preferred stock to its members 
instead of redeeming their equity retains with cash 
payments; its members can choose to hold the stock 
or sell it (Garrison-Sprenger 2004). Thus preferred 
stock offerings, along with joint ventures and legis-
lative reforms to allow investment by nonproducers 
in cooperatives, can be used to relax the constraints 
created by the user-ﬁ  nanced principle on coopera-
tives building their brand.
The User-Control Principle
As previously noted, the homogeneous composition 
of agricultural marketing cooperatives can create 
signiﬁ  cant governance challenges. The cooperative 
National Grape supplies grapes to Welch’s, its whol-
ly owned processing and marketing subsidiary, and 
uses a dual-board structure. The thirteen producer 
members on National Grape’s board elect Welch’s 
board, which consists of four National Grape direc-
tors, two executive ofﬁ  cers of Welch’s, and four 
outside professionals. This dual-board structure 
enables Welch’s to focus on product development, 
manufacturing, marketing, and sales of packaged 
goods (Amanor-Boadu et al. 2003).
Joint ventures can also alleviate the governance 
problems attributable to the user-control principle. 
CHS structured subsidiaries for its numerous joint 
ventures with IOFs. No producer members sit on 
the boards of these subsidiaries; the boards consist 
of CHS’s management and the executive ofﬁ  cers of 
its joint venture partners. The board of the Global 
Berry Farms joint venture has a similar composi-
tion, along with a public member. Such board mem-
bers have considerably more expertise in marketing 
branded products than producer-members.
Conclusions
Cooperative principles create obstacles to coop-
eratives’ brand-building efforts, but they can be 
overcome. Several cooperatives, including Na-
tional Grape, DFA, and CROPP/Organic Valley, 
have used nontraditional structures to develop, or 
to have access to, strong brands for their coopera-
tives. Additional research is warranted to identify 
alternative approaches used by cooperatives abroad, 
particularly in Europe and Australia, where coopera-
tive brands are relatively strong. As the U.S. food 
industry becomes increasingly consolidated, it be-
comes critical for agricultural marketing coopera-
tives to reassess their competitive strategy to ensure 
that they are positioned to compete effectively in 
the future.
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